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PREJAOE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to clarify the
notion ot common sense in the philosophy of G. E. Moore.

As

such, it will serve as no more than a propaedeutic tor evaluating
whether a common sense philosophy is viable.

The scope of dis-

cussion is admittedly JD.70pic: there is no presentation of earlier
common sense philosophies, nor criticisms of such philosophies.
~e

only excuse tor this omission is that it is impossible thor-

~ughly

to discuss even the twentieth-century material in a short

work.

For this reason, this paper can serve as little more than

a "preliminary propaedeutic."
To Pr. Maziarz I extend a sincere thank you for allowing
philosophy to be enjoyable and dull.

•
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, idealism was
the philosophy of the day. 1 '?o a great extent, it was G. E.

-

Moore who brought about the downfall of idealism, and gave early

twentieth-century thought its thrust towards realism.

Yet it is

important to notice that the philosophical community was ripe tor
this transition.

'l'he following remarks are designed to indicate

some of the philosophers who contributed to this climate.
A.
One

or

From Scotland to America

the origins of twentieth-century realism la;y in

the Scottish common sense philosophy of 'l'homas Reid (1710-1?96)
In addition to the abbreviations used in the bibliographJ
the following abbreviations are used in the footnotes.
Works by Moore:
di
• !he Commonplace Book of G. E. Moore, 1919-1953
""'Befence"• irx-Detence of! Ooiim'Oii' lJinse"Lectures • Lectures on Philoso:ebz, ed. by c. Lew.y
PE
• :P.i'!ncl:eia~hlca
'15roottt • "Proof of! an Eiternal 'World"
"Reply,. • "A Reply to f\y' Critics"
SMPP
• Some Main Problems ot Philoso:phY
Other-Works: EM
• The !Pistemolo~ of G. E. Moore, by E. D. Klemke
1[Q!
•
!• Moore:
ritical-Exposltion, by A. R. White
l"'?he main tendency of nineteenth-century thought was
towards the conclusion that both 'things' and tacts about things
are dependent for their existence and their nature upon the operations ot a mind." John Passmore, A Hundred Years of PhilosopbY
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), p7 1?4.
--

g.

A

1

2

and Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856). 2

This naive form of real-

ism was, like Kant's critical philosophy, a reaction to the scepticism of Hume.

While Scottish common sense philosophy had some

effect upon English philosophers, including Moore,3 it had even
more of an impact in America, where it was introduced by John
Witherspoon (1723-1794) and James Mccosh (1811-1894). 4 However,
its impact in America was tempered by German idealism, which was
imported

sho~tly

afterwards.

And the realism that was kept alive

--by philosophers like Francis Ellingwood Abbot (1837-1903) and
Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914)--was subjected to yet another
current of thought: continental philosophy.
B.

Continental Assistance

Two continental philosophers were instrumental in the
~ise

of realism in America and England.
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) called attention to the inten-

tional character of knowledge: the distinctive characteristic of
mental phenomena is that they point towards an object.

But this

lfirst step towards realism was brought up short by the question
2 cf. E. Hershey Sneath's introduction to The Philosoph.y
of Reid (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1892), pp.-rr-61 ands. A.
~ave, The Scottish Philosophy a.! Comr~on Sense (Oxford: Clarenion PreS"S';" 1960).
3cr. M:CE, pp. 191-9. Rev. Denis Cleary, I.e. argues
!that there is--a-"°lack of historical sense" in Moore's philosophy,
and Cambridge philoso:phy in general. "An Essay on G.E. Moore,"
Downs. Rev., 81 (1963) 9 214-6, 223-5.
4
Herbert W. Schneider, A Histori of American Philosophl•
2d ed. (New York: Columbia Univ7 ~ross, 1°9b3), pp. 216-20.

3

of how objects are related to mental acts.
tano held that the object of

~nowledge

tent which one has before his mind.

Prior to 1900, Bren-

is identical with the con-

But this position gave rise

to the problem of fictional things: a centaur may be a content of
r.

a mental act, but it is not an independent object./

It was Mei-

nong who found a solution to this problem.
Alexius von Meinong (1853-1920) accepted the intentional
character of knowledge, but deemed it

inc~edible

to consider a

physical object as being identical with, or a constituent or, a
mental act.

To resolve this problem, he adopted Twardowski's

distinction of (i) the mental act, (ii) its content, and (iii)
its objects.

This enabled him to say that fictional things are

the objects of thought, but not the content of thought (since the
content exists). 6 It was Meinong's contribution to the problem
of the intentional or referential character of knowing fictional
things which was first adopted by American realists.
C.

American Realism

When Josiah Royce (1855-1916) stated his opposition to
~ealism,

his former pupils, R. B. Perry (1876-1957) and

Montague (1873-1953), were quick to provide a defense.

w.

P.

The es-

sence of Royce's attack on realism was this: if the objects of
5Passmore, .QJ2.• cit., pp. 1?8-80. See also: Roderick M.
Chisholm (ed), Realism and the-Background of Phenomenology (New
York: Free Press, 1960)-;J?°p:--4-6.
~
6 Passmore, .2£• £!.!., pp. 180-1, 556 n. 10; Chisholm, .2£•
cit., pp. 6-12 •
..........

4

knowledge are completely independent of our knowing them, then
there is no relation possible, not even the knowing relation.
The essence of the reply to Royce was that relatedness and independence are compatible characteristics of knowledge and its ob. t •7
JeC

Somewhat later, it was argued that they are compatible

because, as James and Russell had shown, relations are external.
From this it follows, presuming that knowledge is a relation, that the known is not constituted by its relation
to the knower, or the knower by its relation to the
known, or either knower or known by the fact that it is
a constituent in the knowledge relation.8
The exchange between Royce and his pupils brought out the
central issue in American realism: the relation between the object and that through which the object is known.
eral agreement

~

There was gen-

knowledge of independent objects is possible.

The intentionality of perception and knowledge is prima facie
evidence for this.

Then too, our knowledge is both reliable and

seemingly not a consequence of our purpose, which suggests that
it is an effect of independent objects.

Thirdly, both our exper-

ience and our language "presuppose" the independence of the objects of knowledge, and it seemed difficult, if not impossible,
to regard these as nonsense.9

However, it was difficult to

?Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, 1900; R. B.
Perry, "Professor RoyceTSRefutatIO!i "OrRealism and Pluralism,"
Monist, 12 (1902), pp. 446-58;; w. P. Montaguet "Professor Royce's
He.futation of Realism," Philos. ~·, 2 (1902;, pp. 43-55·
8 Passmore, .212• .£!..:!!., p. 261.
9Thomas English Hill, Contemporar~ Theories of Knowledge
(New York: Ronald Press Co., 1961), pp. l 0-21.

5
explain this common sense relation:
jects related?

!!2.!

are knowledge and its ob-

It was in answering this question that two

"schools" developed in America: the new realists and the critical
. t s. 10
rea1 is
New Realism was characterized by monism: there is no
----distinction between the object and that through which it is
1.

known.

Knowledge is a direct apprehension of its object.

Thus,

in an attempt to describe experience without reference to consciousness, Perry spoke of ideas as "things in a certain relation."

However, this lack of distinction between a subjective

and objective knowing made it very difficult for the new realists
to adequately account for error without compromising the independence of the object.

And realists such as

w.

P. Montague (1873-

1953) who did make this distinction found it difficult to avoid a
representative or dualistic account of knowledge. 11
2.
~s

Critical Realism was characterized by dualism: there

a distinction between the object and that through which it is

Known.

That is, the critical realists assert "that there are

three distinct ingredients in perception--the perceiving act,
'3omething given • • • and the object perceived. 1112
With idealist against new realists, critical realists
have properly claimed that (1) knowledge involves at
one state or another an active experiencing that cannot

~·

lOibid., p. 119 9 Passmore,~·£.!.!., p. 260, Chisholm,
.£?..!!., pp. 22-34.
11

~., pp. 122-4; Passmore, 2.E• £!_!.,pp. 263-4.

12 Pa.ssmore, op. cit., p. 283.

6

be assimilated to objects. With new realists against
idealists, critical realists have rightly claimed that
knowledge involves objects that are independent of
being known. And with both against representative realists, critical realists have recognized that [3] knowledge
is apprehension not merely of one's own cognitive experiences but of the objects themselves intended in such experiences.13

r2J

The problem in this case was to explain
mediated and direct.
sense data) known?

~

knowledge can be both

How are independent objects (and not merely
To avoid a sceptical solution, the critical

realists held that what is given is a datum which points beyond
itself to an object.

But there was considerable controversy over

the nature of what is given.

George Santayana (1863-1952),

~or

example, held that the given is a set of universals or essences.

R.

w.

Sellars (1880-19

), on the other hand, believed that the

given is a set of particulars which reveal the structure of the
object.
D.

English Realism

The realism which sprang up in England arose from various
sources.

For example, the realism developed by John Cook Wilson

(1874-1915) grew out of his interest in logic.

Others--like Sam-

uel Alexander (1859-1938), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947),
Bertrand Russell (1872-19?0) and C. D. Broad (188?-19
Primarily concerned with the problems of science.

)--were

Finally, there

were those like T. P. Nunn (1870-1944) and G. E. Moore (18?3-

1958), whose realism was bound up with the notion of common sense.
l3Hill, .2.12•

.£.!.i••

P• 155.

CHAPTER II
MOORE ON COMMON SENSE
George Edward Moore (1873-1958) began his schooling at
Dulwich College in London.
~i ty

When he was eighteen, he went to Tri-

College, Cambridge to pursue his interest in classical stu-

dies.

Moore had almost completed his second year of studies (in
1894) before he decided to study philosophy. 1 Moore's philosophical curiosity was piqued by the things philosophers like J. E.

M. McTaggart had said about the world, for their philosophical
assertions seemed to contradict common sense. 2 F. H. Bradley was
unequivocal on this subject; he "argued that everything common
sense believes is mere appearance."3

Under this kind of influ-

ence, Moore's confidence in common sense waned.
cation showed that he had made an about-face. 4
1

G. E. Moore, "An Autobiography,"

~.

His first publi-

p. 13.

2 Ibid., p. 14. Broad once asked, "In what place is th~
mirror-imageof a pin?" Russell thought that the answer is: "In
~our head."
Moore observed: "Whether you are interested in the
question whether Russell is right as to this or not is • • • a
good test of whether you will be interested in philosophy or not."
"The Justification of Analysis," Analysis, 1 (1934), p. 29.
~ertrand

3Bertrand RusBell, "Autobiography," The Philoso~bx of
Russell, ed. by Paul A. Schilpp (Lonaon: dambridge-Univ •

.Press, l946J, P• 36.
4

"In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Time Exist?"
Mind, n.s., 6 (1897), pp. 235-40.

7

8

He argued that time does not exist, and he did so using
Bradley's methods and premises, in particular the dogmas
of internal relations and concrete universals and the
principle that identifies reali·t;y with the absence of
contTadiction. When his conclusions, like the one that
time does not exist, proved to outrage common sense,
Moore was prepared to say that common sense is simply
wrong, and he did so more than once.'
After graduation in 1896, Moore began working on a paper
in order to compete for a fellowship at Trinity. 6 It was during
[this period that 1'1oore severed his philosophical ties to idealism.

He describes the period from 1897-8 as "the beginning of a breakaway from belief in Bradley's philosophy, of which, up till about
rthen, both Russell and I had, following McTaggart, been enthusiastic admirers."?

What is significant in this break is that com-

mon sense became more than a mere starting point in Moore's philpsophy.

It became the foundation of his philosophy.
This chapter will indicate how Moore def ended the truth

pf common sense, and then attempt to discover some identifying
~haracteristics

of common sense.

A. Moore's Defense

2f. Common Sense:

Ag Ex:position

This section contains merely a summary of two passages in
which Moore presents a defense of common sense.
5John O. Nelson, "George Edward Moore, 11 The Enc~clo~edia
~ Philosouh~, ed. by Paul Edwards, Vol. 5 (New-yQrk:acm llun,

L96?),

p. ~7

.

6 Moore submitted his paper in 1898 and won a six-year
nPrize" Fellowship. His paper was published the following year
under the title: "The Nature of Judgment."
7Moore, .2.E.•

£!.i., P• 22.
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1.

"A Defence

.2f

Common Sense" (1925).

This article be-

~ins

with (1) a list of common sense truisms which Moore knows,

~ith

certainty, to be true.
There exists at present a living human body, which is
body. This body was born at a certain time in the
past, and has existed continuously ever since, though
not without undergoing changes • • • Among the things
which have, in this sense, formed part of its environment (i.e., have been either in contact with it, or
at some distance from it, however great) there have,
at every moment since its birth, been large numbers of
other living human bodies, each of which has, like it,
(a) at some time been born, (b) continued to exist from
some time after birth • • • Finally (to come to a different class of propositions), I am a human being, and I
have, at different times since my body was born, had
many different experiences, of each of many different
kinds: e.g., I hav8 often perceived both my own body and
other things • • •
~

Next, Moore adds (2) a single truism: many human beings have frequently known "a proposition correspondin5 to each of the propositions in (l)."9

Finally, he enumerates (3) some implications

of his list of truisms: (i) material things are real; (ii) space
li.s real; (iii) time is real; and (iv) at least one self is real.le

If, for example, "I have often had dreams, and have had many different feelings at different times," it follows that time is real
Moore's thesis is that (2) and (3) are true.

He begins

his defense by noting:
There are some philosophers, who, while denying that (in
the senses in question) either material things or Space
8 "Defence "
'

-

PP
_, p

. 33 .

9Ibid., P• 34.

-

lOibid., pp. 38-39.

10

are real, have been willing to admit that Selves and Time
are real, in the sense required. Other philosophers, on
the other hand, have used the expression 'Time is not
real,' to express • • • something which is inconpatible
with the truth of any of the propositions in (1).11
rJbile such expressions as "Material things are not real" may be
~biguous,

their ordinary usage is certainly incompatible with

As such, they are certa:Lnly false.

(2).

ments to substantiate his claim.

Moore offers four argu-

First of all, a denial of (2)

or any of the implications stated in (3) is incompatible with the
~ery

existence of any philosopher.

The philosopher's own spa-

tial, temporal existence prohibits him from denying the reality
of space, time and selves.

That is, philosophers are human

beings; and this is to say that they have had experiences corresoonding to Moore's list of truisms.

Secondly, "no philosopher

bas ever been able to hold such views consistently. 1112

He would,

ifor example, allude to a "we" who do not know such and such.
All philosophers have belonged to the class of human beings
which exists only if (2) be true: that is to say, to the

~~~~= ~~r~'!!:~~n~~!:g~ow~~c~a~~ ~~=q~~~;~~i~~~ l~ ~~)~I3
0

Thirdly, some philosophers contend that the list of truisms proposed by Moore are not "wholly true, because every such proposition entails both of two incompatible propositions. 1114 Moore
11

Ibid.,
12

P• 39.

Ibid., p. 40.
l3Ibid., p. 41.

-

14Ibid. This objection and Moore's reply are too laconic
to be clear:--For Moore's possible meaning, cf. bis Lectures, pp.

20

rr.

11

replies, "All of the propositions in (1) are true; no true proposition entails both of two incompatible propositons; therefore.
none of the propositions in (1) entails both of two incompatible
propositions. 111 5

Finally, the truth of the propositions in (3)

is clear from the fact that all of the propositions in (1) are
true. This is, Moore claims, his best argument. 16
Other philosophers have objected to Moore's insistence
that he is certain.

The objection is that no one knows for cer-

tain propositions about the existence of material things or
selves.

Moore replies that this objection is self-contradictory.

When be says "No human being has ever known of the
existence of other human beings," he is saying: "There
have been many other human beings beside myself, and
none of them (including myself) has ever known of the
existence of other human beings. 11 1?
"Proof of an External World" (1939).

2.

In this arti-

cle, Moore attempts to offer a conclusive proof of the existence
of "things outside of us."
(a)

With an eye on Kant's discussion of this problem,

Moore spends a good deal of time clarifying the notion of "things
outside of us."

His analysis results in identifying "things out-

side of us" with "things to be met with in space."

(Thus he ex-

cludes things which are external to our mind and Eresented in
~pace,

but which are not

~

16Ibid., p. 42.

-

l?Ibid., PP• 42-3.

in space--such as after-images,

12

double images, bodily pains and dreams~) 18

He concludes this

part by saying:
I want now to emphasize that I am so using 'things to be
met with in space' that, in the case of each of these kinds
of 'things,• from the proposition that there are 'things'
of that kind it follows that there are things to be met
with in space: e.g., rrom the proposition that there are
plants or that plants exist it follows that there are
things to be met with in space.19
(b) Moore then proceeds to show that anything which is to
be met with in space must be external to my mind.

Consider the

differences between what is external to my mind and what is i!!, my
mind.

One difference is that what is external to my mind (e.g.,

my body) is to be met with in space, whereas what is in my mind
(e.g., bodily pain) is not to be met with in space.

But there is

a second, and more important difference.
Whereas there is a contradiction in supposing a pain which
I feel or an after-image which I see to exist at a time
when I am having no experience, there is no contradiction
in supposing mx body to exist at a time when I am having
no experience.20
1811 Proof," PP, pp. 131-6.

Regarding this section, Levi
observes: anoore's pUrpose in this analysis is not merely to show
that 'things presented in space' fall outside the conception of
'things external to our minds,• but also to underline the doctrine of a realistic epistemology that 'there is no contradiction
in supposing that there have been and are to be met with in space
things which never have been, are not now, and never will be perceived.'" Philoso)hy and the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1959 , p:---45~
1 9Ibid., p. 137. The reason this follows is that there
could not Dea plant which was not to be met with in space. (p.13

s:

20Ibid., p. 143. Cf. also: CB, p. 106. Klemke states
Moore's po1nrvery clearly. "For any object X: a) X is in my
mind, if from a proposition that X exists at time tl, there logically follows a proposition that I was having an experience at
tl. b) X is external to my mind, if from a proposition that X
exists at tl, there does not logically follow a proposition that

13
fhus, what is to be met with in space does not imply that I am
experiencing it, which is to say, it is external to my mind.
Combining his first and second analyses, Moore offers
nis proof.

There are ever so many kinds of 'things', such that, in
the case of each of these kinds, from the proposition
that there is at least one thing of that kind there follows the proposition [l] that there is at least one thing
to be met with in space • • • [and, 2] that there is at
least one thing external to our minds: e.g., from 'There
is at least one star' there follows not only 'There is
at least one thing to be met with in space" but also
'There is at least one external thing•.21
rehus Moore contends that by holding up his two hands• he has proiven the existence of external things.
I was having an experience at tl.

He considers this a proof

"G. E. Moore's Proof of an
External World, !Im• p. 279.
21 Ibid., pp. 143-4. Moore's "Proof" is also summarized
oy Klemke.---rii the second part of his article, Klemke proposes
the following explicit formulation of Moore's argument.
"Let us adopt the following as abbreviations to be used
in the full proo~:
E\tl:
external world
OU: outside of us
E:
external
EM: external to our minds
EE: empirically external
rm: to be met with in space
H: hand
HE,t: has an experience, at time t
fhen Moore's 12!:Q£f .of an external world is:
i) o~ •
= Ef'bC
2~ ~$ x) (x • x~ tl)
(3y) (HEy, tl)J ~EMx
3 3x) (Hx, tl fr(3y) (HE, tl)
11

11

-me • Msx
+

4
x) (Hx, tl ~ (3 x) EMx
5~ E\.lz .. (3x) (3y) r(EMx. EMy). (y" :x:)J
6 (Ha • Hb) • (a ,Eb)
? ••• (3 x) (3 y) E(Hx • Hy) • ( y 1' x) J
8) .•. (3x) (3y) (EMx: • EfV) • (y 1' x)J
9) (3 z ) EW'z "
1
___ , p. 28')
~.
"G. E. Moore Proof of an Ext erna l 1wOr
ld 9 " SPM
-

14
Decause it fulfills the necessary conditions tor having a proot;
(1) the conclusion is ditterent .from the premiss, {2) the premiss
is certain, and (3) the conclusion follows trom the premiss.

To

one who objects that he has not proved the premiss, Moore replies
~hat

he did not intend to do so, nor is it possible to do so.

"How am I to prove now that 'Here's one hand, and here's another'? I do not believe I can do it." 22 But this situation does
not alter the tact that "I can know things, which I cannot
prove." 2 3

B.

Moore's Notion

.2! Common Sense: Al! Intez:pretation

In order to appreciate Moore's philosophical starting
point, and his reasons tor regarding it as foundational. it is
~eeessary

to answer two preliminary questions: (1) when is a

statement to be considered a statement of common sense? and (2)
~hen

is a statement or common sense true?
The main problem in attempting to answer these questions

is that Moore did not explicitly deal with them.

So the only way

or finding an answer is to carefully observe Moore's use or common sense, and then state what is implicit in his use. !'ltl.s has
been done by Alan R. White. 24 White contends that there i~ deri~itely

one, and possibly two criteria by which to determine whe22Ibid.,
............... P• 149 •

23 Ibid., P• 150.
24White, "Moore's Appeal to Common Sense," Ph.ilos., 33

{1958), 221-39; M:OE, PP• 9·20.

15
ther a statement is actually a statement of common sense: universal acceptance and, possibly, compulsive acceptance.

White also

contends that there are several additional criteria by which to
determine whether a statement of common sense is true: inconsistency, a particular type of inconsistency, and self-evidence.

He leaves unanswered the question as to which of these criteria
is necessary or sufficient to determine the truth of a common
sense belief.
In this section, I will present White's analysis, and
then attempt to show why it needs to be reformulated.

My

purpose

will be to determine what are the criteria of common sense and
its truth.

---

1. Criteria for Common Sense Statements.
--~--

~---

According to

White, the first characteristic of all common sense statements is
that of universal acceptance. 2 5 This means that only statements
which are "commonly or generally or universally or constantly
~ssumed

to be true" can be considered statements of common

aense. 26

For example, it is generally accepted as true that the
~arth had existed for many years before we were born. 27 The secpnd criterion suggested by White is that of compulsive acceptance. 28

For example• we cannot help believing in the existence

2 5M:CE, p. 11. Klemke agrees with White on this and the
rollowing criterion, ll1• P• 21.
26M:CE, p. 11.

-

27 1•Defence" _,
PP p. 33.

28M:OE, p. 12.

16
of external objects. 2 9

It is not clear whether or not this second criterion is
necessary in order to have a common sense statement.30

It is

tempting to treat the two criteria as being interdependent, since
compulsive acceptance implies a universal acceptance.

That is,

one is apt to think that a given common sense belief is universally accepted as true because we cannot help believing it.
is this how Moore uses these criteria?

But

According to Moore, to

say that a given belief is universally accepted actually means
"commonly or generally" accepted.3l
not a criterion
~t

o~

So strict universality is

common sense beliefs.

And this implies that

least some common sense beliefs might not be compulsively ac-

~epted.

Now the fact that some common sense beliefs have changed

~rom one era to another,3 2 and that there is often only general
~cceptance

~ommon

~hat

of these beliefs might be taken as evidence that some

sense beliefs are not compulsively accepted.

Yet the fact

some beliefs have changed does not prove that they were not

~ompulsively

accepted as true.

It would seem, then, to be a fair description of Moore's
usage to say that the one necessary criterion of common sense
statements is that they are "commonly accepted as true"; and the
2 9Moore, "Hume's Philosophy," .£:§, PP• 157, 163-4.
30M:CE, p. 11. Cf • .!!':!t P• 21.
31 cr. "Defence", ~. p. 44. See also: "The Nature and
Reality of Objects of Perception, 11 E§, pp. 31, 42-3.

32Cf. SMPP, pp. 3, ?, 8-9, 13.

-
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su.f ficient criterion is thR.t the;y be "compulsively accepted as
true."
Does Moore use any other criteria not; mentioned by 1.Jh.i te?
One possibility would be that all common sense bel5.efs are ex-

pressf'!d in ordinary Janguage.33

However, this does not seem to

be a distinct or additional criterion, for the notion "commonly
accepted" seems to imply the notion "expressed in ordinary laner·ua.ge.
0

A sAcond possible criterion would be psychological cer-

fl

-

ltainty, for "we believe that we do really know" common sense be-

~iefs.3

4

.

But again, this seems to be contained in the notion

"commonly accepted

as~·"

Criteria .2! Truth.

2.

-

Although we believe that we know

la given common sense belief, we make a

distinct~.on

"between

rthinga which are now absolutely known; things which were formerly
believed, but believed wrongly; and things which we do not yet
Know."35

While common acceptance and compulsive acceptance are

reasons for considering a given common sense belief to be true,
~either

criterion is sufficient to determine its truth.

What

~ther

criteria does Moore use to determine whether a given common

~ense

belief is true?

White suggests that there are several cri-

teria.

33E.g., "Defence," PP, pp. 35-6.

This assertion seems
true of Moore's practice, tnough it may not be true of what he
says about his practice, ibid., p. 37.
34SMPP, p. 12.

-

35Ibid., p. 1.3.

-

-

Cf. "Defence," PP, pp. 44-5.
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(a) The first criterion White suggests in inconsistencyupon-denial: a given common sense belief is true when it is, some
now, inconsistent to deny it.36 There are five or six variations
of this criterion.

One type of inconsistency is that of presup-

posing the very common sense belief which one is attempting to
disprove.

For example,

Any philosopher who asserts positively that other men,
equally with himself, are incapable of knowing any external facts, is, in that very assertion, contradicting himself, since he implies that he does kno~ a great many
facts about the knowledge of ot~men.5?
Another type of inconsistency is that of basing an argument
(which denies a common sense statement) on premisses that are
less certainly true than the common sense statement to be disproved.

Consider the following case.

Russell's view that I do not know for certain that this is
a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I am right,
on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I
don't know these things immediately; (2) That I don't
follow logicall~ from any thing or things that I do know
immediately; (3) That, if (1) and (2) are true, my belief in or knowledge of~hem must be 'based on an analogical or inductive argument'; and (4) That what is so
36EM, p. 22. White refers simply to "inconsistency."
The fact tnat common sense is "opposed to the paradoxical" seems
to be an expression of the criterion of inconsistency. Cf. S.A.
Grave, "Common Sense," The Encyclopedia of Philosophl' Vol. 2,
ed. by Paul Edwards (Ne'W'"York: Macmillan-;-196?), p. 56.
3?ttoore, "Hume's Philosophy," PS, p. 158. Cf. also: "Defence," PP, pp. 42-3 (quoted on p. 11 aoove); "The Nature and
Reality Of Objects of Perception," PS, pp. 31-2; SMPP, p. 202.
White's second type of inconsistency is "where an alleged
disproof of a common sense belief does not presuppose its truth
but the truth of the ~ of belief, namely a common sense belief,
which is being denied."(H:CE, pp. 12-3) This type of inconsistency seems so similar t'O"tlie one just presented that its differ~ntiation is unnecessary.
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based cannot be certain knowledge • • • Is it, in fact, as
certain that all these four assumptions are true, as that
I .£2. know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious?
I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that
I i!Q. know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious,
than that any single one of these four assumptions is
true, let alone all four.38
A third example is the inconsistency of denying the implications
of common sense beliefs• i.e., of things we know to be true.
E.g., the proposition that my body has existed for many
years past, and has, at every moment during that time
been either in contact with or not far from the earth,
is a proposition which implies both the reality of mater~ things • • • and also the reality .2f Space.3lJ°""
Fourthly, it is inconsistent to deny a common sense belief and
thereby contradict other beliefs which we hold to be true.

This

seems to be part of the naturalistic fallacy: it is inconsistent
to maintain an identity between 'good' and something else

(~),

Fineven self-contradictory, to maintain

and also maintain that it makes sense to ask, "Is x good?u
ally, it is inconsistent,

that we know certain things "to be features in the Common Sense
view, and that yet they are not true; since to say that ~ know
this, is to say that they are true. 1140 This is the special kind
38Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism," PP, P•' 226. See also: "Hume's Philosophy," PS, p. 160; "Certainty,"~. p. 24?;
"Some Judgments of Perception," ~. p. 228.
39"Defence," E_~, pp. 38-9. ,Cf.~. p. 12.
40Ibid., p. 44. Moore also says of some truisms that "if
they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether
we know this or not), it follows that they are true." (p. 45,
italicized). Malcolm interprets Moore as saying that the proposition "There is a Common Sense view of the world" entails such
things as "Time is real" and "Space is real." Therefore, if
there is a common sense view of the world, then the entailea
propositions are true. "Critical Notice of G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition,"~. 69 (1960), pp. 93-4.
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of inconsistency referred to by White.

But as White himself

notes, this is probably only a particular variation of the first
type of inconsistency mentioned above; and so it can be ommitted
as a distinct criterion of truth. 41 To summarize: a common sense
belief is true when its denial is inconsistent with accepting
(i) its truth, (ii) a less certain truth, (iii) other things one
holds to be true; or when (iv) one denies the implications of
pommon sense beliefs.
Two comments are in order.

First, we need to distinguish

a logical inconsistency from what might be called existential
inconsistency.

Thus, Moore maintained that it is inconsistent to

deny a common sense belief because this involves the logical inconsistency of self-contradiction, or of denying the conclusion
of a valid syllogism; or because the denial involves the existential inconsistency of accepting what is less certain, or of accepting what is incompatible with other beliefs we hold to be
true.

Secondly, both types of inconsistency seem to be related

to the criterion of compulsive acceptance.

Speaking about Hume,

for example• Moore says:
He points out, with regard to all such excessively sceptical opinions that we cannot continue to believe them for
long together--that, at least, we cannot, for long together, avoid believing things flatly inconsistent with them. 42
It would seem, then, that the compulsive character of many common
41 M:CE, p. 14. White believes that this argument is similar to an--apj)eal to the paradigm case. (pp. 36-?).
42 Moore, "Hume's Philosophy,".!:§, p. 15?. Emphasis mine.
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sense beliefs is merely the consequence of the inconsistency

If this is so, then

wbich results when these beliefs are denied.

inconsistency-upon··denial would be a clearer formulation of the
criterion wbich is sufficient for having a common sense statement.

However, when considering the truth of a common sense be-

lief, the criterion of inconsistency is not sufficient.

Like

the first two criteria, inconsistency-upon-denial may be a reason
for holding a belief to be true, but it does not prove it to be
true. 4 3 Nor is there any evidence in Moore's writings to indicate that inconsistency-upon-denial is a necessary condition for
the truth of a common sense statement.
(b) We are left, then, with only one criterion of the
truth of common sense beliefs: self-evidence.

The kind of thing

Moore has in mind when he speaks of something as self-evident is
our belief that there are "enormous numbers of material objects;
~nd

there are also a very great number of mental acts or acts of

Consciousness." 44

Similarly, it is self-evident that personal

~ffection is intrinsically good. 4 5 Now while Moore maintains
~hat

self-evidence is the sole criterion of the truth of a common

•ense belief, he does not believe that it constitutes a Eroof of
rthat belief.
~vident

"If, therefore, anybody asserts • • • that

to him that one and the same action

~

it is

be both right and

4 3White agrees that this is true for at least the first
four types of inconsistency enumerated above (M:CE, p. 14).
44 8 Mnn
~' P• 4 •
4

5~, p. 188.

-
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ong, I do not see how it can be proved that he is wrong. 1146 In

other words, self-evident
e shown to be true.

~ruths

cannot be proved; they can only
4
There are no criteria for self-evidence. 7

or example, there is no evidence that can prove what kinds of
-hings ought to exist for their own sakes. 48

Thus, for Moore,

elf-evidence is the sufficient criterion of the truth of common
beliefs.
However, Moore did speak aboui, proving some common sense
He tried to prove, for example, that there is an exteral world. 4 9 But there is no real incompatibility between his
otions of proof and self-evidence.

If someone denies a common

belief, if he does not see its self-evidence, then all
could do was attempt to show that it ie somehow inconsisent to deny the common sense belief.

He recognized that all his

"proofs" rested upon an unprovable or self-evident premiss.

His

"proofs'' were an attempt to make one see the self-evident characer of a belief .50

They were not aimed at establishing the truth

46 Ethics, p. 86. Cf. also "The Refutation of Idealism,"
here Moore says: if an idealist asserts that "esse is percipi"
s self-evident, then Moore can only say that "ttdoes not appear
o me to be so." (!:§, p. 11).
4

7~, pp. 75, 145, 160; Ethics, p. 86; ~. p. 191.

48

~, pp. viii, x.

4

9"Proof," ~. p. 149; ~. p. 120; "Reply," ~. PP•

50"The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception," PS,
55-6; "Hume's Philosophy," PS, pp. 148-50, 159-60; "PfOOf,'
P, pp. 148-50; "Defence," PP, pp. Yi, 44; SMPPf pp. 191, 237;
ics p. 86. But cf. alsO: Murphy, "MoorerB' Defence of Common
.....,.e"""'n"""s'"'"e- 1 "
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of common sense beliefs, but at rejecting the denial of tbese beliefs.

Moore made no clain to logical certainty; he was only

relatively certain.

This is ·;;o say, ffoore was psychologically

certain simply because he found no good reason not to be. 51

5l"Certainty," ~' p .. 237, 244. For a brief statet1ent of
common sense argument, see V. C. Chappell's example in
"Malcolm on Moore,"~. 70 ~1961), 420-3.
~oore's

CHAPTER III
COMMON SENSE AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE: AN EVALUATION

After first reading Moore's works, it is tempting to simply ask: are his arguments valid?

The difficulty is that; one can·

not answer this question without knowing the "status" of Moore's
arguments.

The debate over this issue centers around the rela-

tionship between common sense and philosophy.
is obviously one or conflict.

The relati.onship

Philosophers have denied both the

truth of common sense beliefs, and our knowledge of them. l

But

are these real conflicts?
Some philosophers consider the conflict between eommon
sense and philosophy only an apparent one because the conflict is
taken to be merely linguistic.
in this chapter.
~ppeal

Thia is the view we will consider

1n effect, then, we will be asking whether an

to common sense is equivalent to an appeal to ordinary

language.

And if there is merely one appeal, is this appeal such

that it can be interpreted as being either an appeal to common
sense or as an appeal to ordinary language; or, ia an appeal to
Pommon sense really a disguised appeal to ordinary language?
1 Moora also mentioned that some philosophers add -to com~on dense belie.f's--they say, for exampltl, "Therd is a <fO'd. n How~ver, these additions were not particularly disturbing to Moore,
aince common sense holds no view regarding ·~hese addi tons 11 and so
~)~ not being contradicted. (SllPP, pp. 2, 16-8; cf. also :pp. 30124
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And if there are two distinct appeals, is one more "basic" than
the other?
Since the linguistic interpretation revolves around a
discussion of ordinary language, we will begin by describing how
Moore utilized ordinary language.

A.

Moore's References to Ordinary L.angµSY)e

Moore ref erred to ordinary language for two general reasons: to clarify what he and others meant, and to ascertain whether what was meant is true or not.
1.

Reflection on Usage: Meani:qs.

Often, Moore's refer-

ences to ordinary language were merely reflections upon ordinary
usage, in order to call attention to how we actually use certain
expressions.

His purpose was simply to be clear about the menni-

of an expression.

Yet his reflections upon ordinary usage were
~ore than practical measures taken in order to be understood. 2

His efforts at achieving clarity were aimed at avoiding the
source of philosophical difficulties, which is attempting "to
answer questions without first discovering precisely what questions it is which you desire to answer.,.3
In attempting to clarify philosophical statements, Moore
used a special technique, called the translation into the concrete.

This is the technique of spelling out in ordina17 language
2

233 ..

ar.

-

!:1!.Q!, p. 32; EM, pp. 40-1; and

3pE
_, p. vii.

Broyl~s,

.2J2.•

~.,

p.
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the implications of a philosophical concept or proposition. 4
How Moore utilized this will be illustrated in the following secti on.

Despite Moore's emphasis on clarity, it is worth keeping
the following observation in mind.
Moore generally chooses to employ language in a straightforward way • • • This is largely based on a consideration of clarity • • • But it is characteristic ot Moore
to treat the ordinary meaning of expressions as unproblematic. He holds that there obviously is an ordinary use
(or several), that we all know perfectly well what it is
(or they are;, and that it would be foolish not to follow
it (or them). No great issues are seen to hinge upon the
ordinary use of language. Moore's faith in ordinary language might almost be described as precritical. It foreshadows none of the coming "wars•t over the status, the
character, the legitimacy of the appeal to ordinary language.5
Th.is serves to remind us that Moore did not give an extended
treatment of the questions raised in this chapter.
2.

Appeal to Usage: Truth.

At times, Moore not only re-

flected upon ordinary language, but actually appealed to it.

In

these situations, he was not only interested in the meaning of an
~ssertion,

but more especially in its truth.

dinary language served two purposes.

His appeals to or-

The first was a construc-

tive appeal to what people commonly say, as indicative of what
~hey

believe.

In this way, ordinary language is something like a

guide to what is commonly, and perhaps compulsively, accepted--a

P• 209.

P• 36.

4 sMPP, PP• 29-30, 135; "The Conception of Reality," E!h

~royles, .21?.• ill.•, P• 234.

Of., e.g., "Defence t"

?Et

I
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guide to common sense beliefs. 6

For example:

We constantly speak as if there were cases in which a
given thing was true on one occasion and false on another;
and I think it cannot be denied that, when we so speak,
we are often expressing in a perfectly proper and legitimate manner something which is undoubtedly true.?
Appeals to ordinary language not only reveal common sense
beliefs; they also reveal weaknesses in some philosophical positions, and thus serve a destructive purpose.

Once Moore had

clarified a particular philosophical assertion by translating it
into the concrete, he was often able to show that it was selfcontradictory. 8

And if someone were to object that Moore's tran-

slation was not what the assertion really meant, tr1en Moore had
at least shown that the statement was not really paradoxical,
and therefore was not really as important as it seemed beforehand. 9

And finally, Moore's technique enabled him to show that

a given philosophical assertion actually does conflict with com~on

sense, in which case it was vulnerable to Moore's appeal to

common sense.

6 cr. M:CE, p. 32; !!'.'.!• pp. 42-3.
type of appear:--

Broyles overlooks this

7 "William James' 'Pragmatism,'" PS, p. 133. Cf. also
"The Refutation of Idealism," PS, PP• 19~0; "Some Judgments of
Perception," PS, p. 226; SMPP,pp. ?, 311; "The Subject Matter of
Psychology," l5roc. Arist.~., 10 (1909), p. 41; "Is Ex:istence
a Predicate?" f.~, pp. 118-9; "Symposium: Indirect Knowledge,"
Arist. Soc., Suppl • .!21.• 9 (1929), pp. 27-9.

-

,gPE, p. 99; "Four Forms of Scepticism," PP, pp. 208-10;
"Defence,,,-PP, pp. 42-3, quoted on p. 11 above.
9"Defence," PP, p. 39; SMPP, p. 204.

-

-
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Consider, for example, how Moore dealt with Hume's Eeepticism.

Moore granted that: ".!!.Hume's principles are true, no-

body can ever E1.9!. of the existence of any material objects."lO
Moore then translates this assertion into a concrete one, and
proceeds to refute it.

If Hume's principles are true, then, I have admitted, I

do not know now that this pencil--the material object-exis:tS'. If ,~erefore, I am to prove that I ,9:.2 know that
this pencil exists, I must prove, somehow, that Hume's
principles, one or both of them, are not true. In what
sort of way, by what sort of argument-;-'Can I prove this?
It seems to me that, in fact, there really is no
stronger and better argument than the following. I do
know that this pencil exists; but I could not know thrs,
if Hume's principles were true; therefotI' Hume's principles, one or both of them, are false.
This example serves to illustrate that Moore's ultimate
appeal was to common sense, not to ordinary language.

However,

it also illustrates the peculiar situation in which Moore seems
to be caught when he appeals to common sense.
be obviously true.

His reply seems to

Yet he cannot convince his opponent, for his

argument begs the question.
One solution to this predicament is to reinterpret just
what is the question under discussion.

For !! there is only a

-

linguistic disagreement, then Moore does not beg the question.
L.Je

will now consider this interpretation o:f the conflict between

common sense

-

and

philosl°1phy.

lOSMPP, p. 119.
11_,
sMPP p. 119-20.
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B.

The RP.ductive· Thesis

According to the reductive thesis, the disagreement between common sense and philosophy is not .factual; it is linguis-

.:E:.£•

When Moore thought he was refuting a factual absurdity, he

was simply pointing out a logical absurdity.
called appeals to common sense
o~dinary

language.

a~e

Thus, Moore's so-

really disguised appeals to

Here is a brief .formulation of the reductive

thesis by Norman Malcolm.
a philosopher maintains that we do not know material
object propositions to be true (Hume) or that we do not
see material things (Prichard), he must be holding that
the notions of knowing a material object proposition to
be t;rue and of seeing a material thing are really selfcontradictory. He certainly cannot be maintaining-rfiat
It is a matter of experience that people do not kn.ow or
see such things. He must be trying to state what he
thinks is an a priori truth. He must be claiming, perhaps
without fully realising it, that ordinary sentences like
''I know that that thing sticking up in the garden is a
shovel," "I see your glasses under the bed,n are selfcontradictory. To understand that this claim is mistaken
it is su.fficient to realize that those sentences do have
a correct use in ordinary discourse, which they cculd not
have if they were self-contradictory. The important function of I1oore • s rebuttal was simply to remind us of this
fact • • • He was not begging the question against Hume
or Prichard because his very point was that it is really
not open to question that such sentences have a correct
use. On my view then, Moore's so-called defence of common
sense, in so far as it is an interesting and tenable philosophical position, has nothim:; to d.o either w:l. th common
sense, properly speaking, nor common belief, but is merely
the assertion, in regard to various sentencGs, that those
sentences have a correct use in ordinury language.12
~~an

We will now consider a lengthier statement of the reductive thesis by Alice Ambrose, followed by Moore's response, and
12Norman Malcolm "Critical Notice o:f. G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition." l1ind, 69 (1960), p. 97.
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some comments.
1.

Example: External Objects.

that there is an external world.

Moore was quite certain

And after analyzing what this

meant, he thought it was quite easy to prove his point.

However,

according to the reductive thesis: (a) Moore's proof of an external world

~

not establish the truth of an empirical proposi-

tion; (b) Moore's technique could not establish the truth of an
empirical proposition of this sort; and (c) once the problem is
clearly formulated, it is evident that Moore was defending ordinary language, and not common sense.

These are the main points
made by Alice Ambrose in her critique of Moore. 1 3
(a)

Ambrose begins by observing:

Prof. Moore considers the proposition, "There are external objects," to be an empirical one. It follows from a
proposition which is established by empirical evidence,
viz., the evidence of the senses. One has merely to show
two hands and one has established that there are external
objects.14
As Moore himself recognized, the sceptic would not be satisfied
with this proof.
If the existence of external objects is in question, then
calling attention to a visual experience-no ai?ferent in
important respects from many past experiences which the
sceptic has precluded from constituting proof will not
convince him.15
That is, what the sceptic requires is a proof of the premiss,
"Here is a hand."
~.

-

This is why Moore's argument does not convince

l.5Alice Ambrose, ''Moore's Proof of an External World,"

pp. 397-41?.
14Ibid., p. 398.

-

l5Ibid., p. 405.

i
'I
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the sceptic of the empirical proposition "There are external
objects."
(b)

Moreover, Moore cannot prove this proposition.

To

"point out" something is to distinguish it from other things.
But one cannot point out anything which is .!12.! an external object.
Therefore, it is impossible to prove that "There are external
objects" by pointing out an external object.

Nor is the proposi-

tion "Th.ere is an external object" entailed by a proposition such
as "There is a dime."

That is, the proposition regarding exter-

nal objects cannot be established even indirectly.
Holding "A dime is an external object" expresses a necessary proposition does not entail holding that anything
which is a dime satisfies all the criteria tor applying
the phrase "external object." For this phrase is not used
to apply to any kind of thing. One will therefore not
have established the existence of any tging of the kind
"external objectn in producing a dime.l
Aside from this, there is a second reason why Moore cannot prove his point.

For there is a catch in the sceptic's claim

that no one can know that external objects exist.

The catch is

that "no possible amount of further evidence would alter the
sceptic's claim about the limitations of our kn owl edge. ,,l?

This

shows that the sceptic's claim is unfalsiriable, and hence, is
not an empirical proposition at all.
(c)

This indicates that the problem needs to be reformu-

lated.
16Ibid., p. 408.

l?Ibid., p. 399.

-

I!
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When the sceptic says no one can know that external
objects exist, he cannot describe what prevents him from
knowing, what obstacle stands in his way. Nor can he describe what kind of thing he would need to know in order
for evidence for the existence of external objects to ~e
complete. He cannot because he wants to say that there
a~e no describable circumstances in which anyone c"O'UI'U be
said to kriow that external objects exist. This comes to
saying that "no one knows external objects exist" cannot
be falsified, that is, that it i~ not an empirical assertion about our ability to know.l

-

Thus, "the scep'l:iic is arguing for the logical impossibility of
knowledge and not for any empirical fact." 1 9 Yet this seems unreasonable, for it implies that such statements as "I know there
is a dollar in my purse" are logically impossible.

The sceptic's

argument is not about empirical matters, and is in such marked
opposition to the way we ordinarily speak that he must actually
be "making a disguised proposal. 1120 That is, he is proposing
that such statements as "No one knows the existence of hands"
should be accepted as necessarily true.

Thus, what appeared to

18 Ibid., p. 402.

-

l9Ibid.
20Lazerowitz offers two additional arguments for this interpretation. Moore summarized these, and replied as follows.
"He [Lazerowitz1 says that i.f they did mean anything more by them
than this, we should have to suppose that they held sincerely
views which they knew to be .false; and that this is impossible •••
To this, I should reply that he is right in saying that we should
nave to suppose that they held sincerely views which they knew to
be .false; but that there is no reason whatever to suppose that
this is impossible--nor does he even try to give any. And he
points out (b) that philosophers in these cases, 'counter facts
with arguments;' that they cannot, by (a), both know the .facts
and regard their arguments as correct arguments against them;
that there.fore they plainly want us to look at the arguments rather than the facts; and, therefore, their arguments are merely
meant to back a verbal recommendation. The last 'taerefore'
seem~~to me to be a simply enormous non-sequitur!" CReply," ~.

-

n. 61::J).
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be a real conflict about factual matters is actually a conflict
over how we should speak.

Now if the sceptic is not really questioning an

em~irical

proposition when he says "No one knows the existence of external
things," then what was Moore really doing when he replied to the
sceptic?
Moore's statement that '"There iJs a hand• entails 'There
is an external object'" calls attention to criteria for
applying "external object words" • • • [He] calls attention to criteria for the use of such words as "hand,"
"dime,u and the like, and in doing this shows that in English it makes sense to say "I know there is a dime in the
box." That is, Moore's argument (although it does not
establish the truth of an empirical proposition about the
existence of a kind of thing, external objects) has as a
consequence that it is lo5icallt possible to know there
are coins in a box. We recall hat ~he sceptic argued as
if it were logically impossible.21
Thus, Moore was actually

resistin~

a

lin~uistic

recommendation

and "insisting on retaining conventions already established in
22
the language about the usage of the words 'know' and 'believe'."
Moore was simply pointing to ordinary usage to show "that the
sceptic's linguistic recommendation is objectionable. 112 3
Moore's Response.

2.

In his reply, Moore tries to cor-

rect four errors in Ambrose's critique.
(a) First of all, Moore believed that one can prove that

external objects exist.

To say that such a proof is impossible

because one cannot "point to" anything which is not an external
21 Ibid., pp. 409-10.
22 Ibid., p. 415.

-

2 3Ibid., p. 411.

~18RAHY
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object is not a valid argument, unless "point to" means only
"point with the finger at."
One can point out to a person an object which is not an
external object • • • You can say to him: "Look a~
bright light for a little while; then close your eyes;
the round blue patch you will then see is not an external
object." • • • And it seems to me that the contrast with
objects Qf this sort enters into the meaning of "external
object. 11 24
(b) Next, Moore

beli~ved

is an empirical proposition.

that "There are external objects"

Ambrose aret1es that this is not an

empirical proposition because "no possible amount of further evidence would alter the sceptic's claim."

Moore replied:

This argument is a good reason for saying that his reason
for denying external objects is not an empirical one • • •
But he is, of course, wrong in thinking that "There are
external objects" is self-contradictory, and, if so,
"There are externalobjects'' may really be an empirical
statement. It seems to me that !;r statement, that there
~· certainly is empirical.
WhY should it not be the
cas~ that from 11Ts false non-empirical statement that
"There are external objects" is self-contradictory, the
philosopher invalidly infers the empirical statement
"There are no external objects?" This seems to me to be
what has actually happened.25
(c) From these two replies, it would seem the.t Moore was

attempting to defend a common sense position.

Ambrose objects:

since our language is used in such a way that "I know that there
is a dollar in my pursen describes what could be the case, the
sceptic is B2.i asserting the non-empirical proposition that such

2411 Reply," ~' P• 671.
2 5 11 Reply," PG.EM, pp. 671-2. Cf. also: CB, pp. 11?, 202.
In commenting on Moore's reply, Ambrose seems t'O"misinterpret
what Moore saiG.. ("Three Aspects of Moore's Philosophy," Ess~s
~ Analysis, pp. 208-9).
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assertions are self-contradictory; therefore, he is making a linguistic recommendation.

Moore replied: "though he knows that

-

such language is often used, yet he is not aware that it ever
describes what could be the case. 1126
(d) Finally, Moore expressed his dissatisfaction with the
reductive thesis as an interpretation of his arguments.

"I could

not have supposed that the fact that I had a hand proved anything
as to how the expression 'external objects' ought to be used. 1127
If he was merely making a recommendation that we should not use
certain expressions in a way which deviates from ordinary usage-"If this is all I was doing, I was certainly making a huge mistake, for I certainly did not think it was all. And I do not
think so now. 1128 An appeal to ordinary language was not satisfactory for Moore's purpose.
A man may be using a sentence perfectly correctly, even
when what he means by it is false, either because he is
lying or because he is making a mistake; and, similarly,
a man may be using a sentence in such a way that what
he means by it is true, even when he is not using it correctly, as, for instance, when he uses the wrong word for
what he means, by a slip or because he has made a mistake
as to what the correct usage is. Thus making a sentence
correctly--in the sense explained--and using it in such a
way that what you mean by it is true, are two things which
are completely logically indepencrent' of one another: either
may occur without the other.29
260 Reply," PGEM, p. 673. Cf. V. C. Chappell, "Malcolm on
Moore,"~' 70 (1~, 419-20.
27uReply " PGEM p. 674.
28 Ibid., p.
675. Cf. also: CB, pp. 196-7.
2 9Ibid., p. 548. Cf. also: PE, pp. 6, 12.

-
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Moore's reply gives a fairly clear indication of his reac
tion to the reductive thesis.

It would seem that Moore considers

the conflict between common sense and philosophy a real one, and
not simply a verbal conflict.

In other words, (1) an appeal to

common sense is (or could be) adequate to refute a philosophical
assertion, whereas an appeal to ordinary language is not adequate;
therefore (ii) an appeal to common sense is not equivalent to an
appeal to ordinary language, which is to say, an appeal to common
sense is not a disguised, linguistic recommendation.30

3.

Comments.

This section contains some remarks on

three topics: an alternative to the reductive thesis, Moore's
reply to Ambrose, and the reductive thesis.
(a) Some commentators have held that what Moore did could
interpreted as defending either common sense or ordinary lanAmbrose, for example, says: "Either interpretation is
lausibly supported by placing different constructions on the
Moore made use of, namely, analysis."3l

This is sur-

for Ambrose devotes so much attention to the ordinary
interpretation, without in any way indicating how a comon sense interpretation could make sense.

James Broyles also
that "the appeals are in essence the same."3 2 However,

-

Cf. EM, PP• 31-9.
31Alice Ambrose, "Three Aspects of Moore's Philosophy,"
sa s in Anal sis, p. 205. Later, Ambrose adds: "It seems to me
a
oore s re u ations • • • are much more convincing when takn as ar~ents whose im~ort is iinguistic than when taken as deending a factual truth. (p. 213;. For examples of this in nperation, cf. Lazerowitz. "Moore and Philosophical Analysis," SPM,
p. 229,3~31.
.
Bro les o • c

3?
he only indicates how "these are not independent techniques"-which is an entirely different issue.

Since no substantial argu-

ment has been offered in behalf of the identity of these appeals,
we can rest with the summary statement of Moore's position: an
appeal to common sense is not equivalent to an appeal to ordinary
language.
{b) Now we can turn to Moore's reply to Ambrose.

It

seems that three of his arguments are adequate for refuting Ambrose' a position; or, at least they are adequate

.!! he is correct

in maintaining that "There are external objects" is an empirical
proposition.

Moore believed that this proposition could be

stood as either an empirical or non-empirical assertion.33

under~

It

can be treated as an empirical proposition insofar as it is supported by evidence of our senses.

For example, a sceptic might

argue that since some sensory experiences are

s~milar

in impor-

tant respects to dream-images, it follows that all sensory experiences one is now having may be mere dream-images.34 Moore would
reply that such a premiss implies that the sceptic knows that
dreams have occurred.

And so the sceptic is inconsistent.

The

sceptic might grant that we cannot always be wrong; he can still
maintain that we are unable to identify those cases in which we

-

-

are correct, in which we do know.

-

In reply, Moore resorts to

33cf. "Reply," PGEM, p. 6?3.
34 "Certainty, 11 Ef, p. 248. This is one kind of argument
for scepticism.
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self-evidence.
If he does not know that he is not dreaming, can he possibly know that he is ~ only dreaming that dreams
have occurred? Can he possibly know therefore that
dreams have occurred? I do not think that he can.35

-

Elsewhere, Moore points out that the issue is an empirical one
because there --:is evidence which can falsify his claim to know,
for example, that he is seeing a table.
he says, "needs no proof to me.

"That I am seeing one,"

If someone were to come & fail

to see one, that would be a reason for me to doubt. 11 36
For Moore, then, the real conflict between common sense
and philosophy (at least in this case) has to do with the
dence for each.

P.Vi-

The lack of proof for self-evident statements

may be unsatisfactory as far

e.s

the sceptic is concerned.

But

for Moore, such unprovable truths are necessary for all reasoning.

Even the sceptic claims to know things by means of ar w..rner:~

But all arguments are based on reasons which support it; all reasoning (mediate inference) depends upon judgments (immediate inference).

Therefore, if we know anything by means of arguments,

there must be something which is self-evident--otherwise there
would be an infinite regress in our reasoning.3?
However, it is important to realize that Moore knew his
arguments begged the question, insofar as the question is non-empirical.

He says, for example: "Now I cannot see my way to deny

-

35°certainty, 11 PP, p. 249.
3 6~, p. 11?.
above.

3?sMPP, P• 121; "Proof,"

.ff, pp.

146, 149-50.

See p. 22
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it is logically possible that all the sensory experiences I
~having now should be mere dream-images. 0 38 The surprising re~hat

sult is that Moore appears to agree with the sceptic, at least
insofar as they are talking about a non-empirical proposition.39
The following seems applicable to Moore, as well as Reid.
Sir James Mackintosh remarks that he observed to Dr. Brown
in 1812 that Reid and Hume 'differed more in words than in
opinion.• Brown answered: 'Yes, Reid bawled out, We must
believe an outward world; but added in a whisper, We can
give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out, We can
give no reason for such a notion; and whispers- I own we
cannot get rid o~ it.'40
Why, then, did Moore seem so perturbed by scepticism?
~ause

Simply be-

he believed that there are times when it is absurd to be-

lieve that what is logically possible (viz., an error) is actually the case. 41 He was anxious to point out that because it is
logically possible for

~

imply that I do not know

to be something else does not in itself

The logical possibility that I may
oe dreaming is no evidence that I!! dreaming. 42 Moore's exampl~
nowever, is not adequate.

~·

For a sceptic would likely grant that

. 38 "Certainty," PP, p. 250.

Th.is is a second kind of argument for scepticism: I'Ogical possibility.
39Notice how Moore, like Hume, defines 'know for certain'
so that to say "I know for certain that .E." implies ".E"• ("Certainty," EE, p. 238.)
40 James Mackintosh• Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosounv. 2d ed. (Edinburg, 1A3?), p. 346. Quoted by S.
iA. Grave, Tne Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 109.
4111 certainty," PP, p. 231.

-

42cr. Philip P. Wiener, "Philoso:phical, Scientific, and
Ordinary Language," J. Philos., 45 (1948) 9 260-?.

!
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one can be directly aware of his states of mind, and so can know
these things.

The problem that the sceptic emphasizes is that we

are not directll aware of material objects.

In a way, the scep-

tic is simply a disenchanted direct or new realist.

But Moore

does not adhere to direct realism either, which implies that he
believed that indirect knowledge (or, a representative theory of
perception) does not prohibit one from knowing empirical facts.
(c) We can turn now from Moore's view to that of the lin-

guist.

Perhaps it would be helpful to state the reductive thesis

in more linguistic terminology, such as the following.
rsome philosophers claimJ that certain ordinary ways ot
talking had always to issue in false statements, no matter how the facts of the particular ease might vary • • •
that a considerable body of ordina{l langu.ase is incorrect Aamf¥age, in the sense that i can never be used in
!he norma c!roumstances of its use to make true assertions.43
Thus, the reductive thesis, when stated linguistically, is simply

a reminder that ordinary language cannot be incorrect language.
However, several problems arise with this interpretation
o! philosophical assertions.

First of all, the linguistic inter-

pretation goes beyond pointing out that various philosophical
statements are non-empirical.

Notice, for example, how Ambrose

continues this kind of interpretation.
It is hard to suppose the sceptic is arguing that such
rnon-empiricalJ propositions are necessarily true when
It is plain that as language is ordinarily used they
are not.44
4 'Richard

G. Benson, "Ordinary Language, Common Sease, and
the 1'1.me-Lag Argument," ~ (196?), p. 28. Emphasis added.
44.Ambrose, "Moore's Proof of an External World," PGEM,
P• 402.

I
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Consider the statement • • • "The sceptic argues as i.f
'no one knows that hands exist' exuresses a necessary
~ro~osition."
Thi3 is to argue as if "knowing hands exist had no application • • • The sceptic knows that
"knowing hands exist" has use, and that "no one knows
there are hands in the world" is used to express something
which can be either true or falde. He is holding that
they should not be so used, only he does not say so explicitly.45
The mistake that Ambrose makes is to ignore the .fact that "knowing hands exist" does not have an ordinary use, when 'knowing'
has the implication of "necessarily true."

In other words, the

sceptic is per.fectly correct in claiming that "knowing hands

-

exist" can have no application in ordinary language, because in
ordinary language, 'knowing' does !!21 imply "necessarily true."
The philosopher, in other words, would distinguish 'correct use' in the sense of 'use in accordance with the
rules o.f ordinary language' from 'correct use' in the
sense of 'use to make true statements', and would claim
that a sentence could have a correct use in the first of
these two senses without having a correct use in the
second. Moore indicates that he thinks the philosopher
is justified both in distinguishing these two senses and
in claiming what he does about their relationship. Malcolm, on the other hand, [like other linguists] denies
that this distinction can be made, or at any rate denies
that a sentence can be correct in the first sense without
being correct in the second.46
Therefore, it does

~

.follow that the sceptic is necessarily

$ayi:ug how we should speak or use the word 'know•--though he
might wish to do this.
~hinking
~he

As Moore was regarded as mistakenly

that a sceptic was speaking about matters of fact, so

linguist mistakenly thinks that the sceptic is speaking in

p. 419.

4 5Ibia., pp. 403-4.
46 v. c. Chappell, "Malcolm on Moore,"~. ?O (1961),
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ordinary language, or has to.
nary language is used in

The linguist overlooks that ordi-

vario~s

contexts, in various spheres or

levels of discourse.
The linguist is bound to reply: ordinary language cannot
be incorrect language.

But this is no valid objection against

the sceptic's position.

As I stated it above, I gave the impres-

sion that the philosopher is not speaking in ordinary language.
This is only partly true.

Por the sceptic could very easily use

ordinary language to state his position.
~ary

He

might say: "In ordi-

language, we say that we 'know• external objects or empiri-

cal facts.

But we also say, in ordinary language, that it is im-

possible to prove that a particular case of knowing is necessarily true.

(The very accusation that Moore had begged the question

is evidence of this).

Therefore, in ordinary language we use

'know• without regard tor logical possibility."

It is important

to notice that this argument is also directed against Moore's
position.

For Moore•s argument is stated in ordinary language:

we know empirical statements in the ordinary sense ot 'know.•
However, if--as the sceptic claims--the ordinary sense ot 'know'
does not include the notion of certainty; then Moore's argument
is completely ineffective against scepticism. 47
A second difficulty with the linguistic interpretation is
that the appeal to ordinary language seems to be based on the
4 7ct. A. c. Ewing, "Knowledge of Physical Objects," in
Non-Limruistic Philosoptq (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968),
P• o-'•

JI
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principle of verification, 48 according to which all cognitively
11eanine;ful

proposi~.:;ions

are either a'l'lalytic or empirical, and

those ilhich Fl.re empirical have cognitive meaning only if they admit of some evidence for or against thelli.

But the assumption of
this analytic-synthetic dichotomy is at least debatable. 4 9 And
it is important to keep this in mind, for it is by means of this
rigid classification that metaphysical assertions are ruled out
as possib1y having CO{jnitive meaning.

we have been restric+.ed

t

~o

Because of this dichotomy,

considering the conflict between com-

mon sense and philosophy as either empirical or linguistic.

The

possibility of a third alternative, or a real, metaphysical conflict has been ruled out.50
The issue might be put this way: "Is the significance of
the language of common sense exhausted when it has been used with
reference to what can fall unde::::- the sense and (the speaker's)
introspection, or does it go beyond this to what these cannot
48 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the appeal to ordinary language is based on "methodological verificationism, 11 or "methodological nominaliam,rr which does not commit
one to the truth of the principle of verification. On a cifficul ty with this position, cf. Ewing,~·£!!., p. 68.
4 9As Moore said, to maintain that metaphysical statements
have no meaning requires identifying these statements by the kind
of meaning they have, which iR the meaning of asserting something
unverifiable. (Cited by Alice Ambrose, Essa.ys in Anal;zsis, p.
207). On the pJ'inciplo of verification• cf. Carl G. Hempel,
"Problemc and Changes in tbe Empiricist Criterion of Meaning,"
Rev. Intern. J>hilos.·, (1950), pp. 41-63.
50Lazerowitz contends that even if there are synthetic
a priori judgments, this type of knowledge does not help solve
the problem. ("Moore and Philosophical Analysis, 11 S?M, p. 243).

-
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reach?''5l

Or we might ask: do common sense beliefs contain a

trans-crapirical content?

,,

I

Ir

51 Grave. -212• .£!!.,

p. 101.

CHAP.rER IV

COMMON SEISE AND ANALYSIS
So tar, we have considered a tew aspects of Moore's nocommon sense, and the relation between common sense and
!he notion or common sense remains problemaic, and the relation between comm.on sense and ordinary language
as not even been adequately stated, much less resolved.

!':bus,

t has been impossible to proceed to the more important question:
as Moore successful in his attempts to defend common sense?
erhaps by considering this issue more directly, it will be easir

to clarity Moore's notion ot common sense--which is the main

onoern or this paper.
When the question of the validity or Moore's arguments is
a common reply is that they are valid on the level or
sense, but irrelevant on the philosophical level.

As

emke says:
In one sense, we understand what it is for tables and
chairs to exist, and, in that sense, we know that there
are such objects • • • However, in another sense, and in
a different context, might one not plausibly hold that
it is sometimes appropriate to question various commonsense assertions, since we know, among other things, that
common sense is often wrong (Moore admits the latter)?
• • • I might suggest, tor example, that I am now sensing
a red datum which is wholly presented to me is absolutely
certain. But I might wonder whether, in this same sense,
it is absolutely certain that there is a red book on that
table over there. Might I not tind that the 'GOOi is

orange, or that the object is a box and not a book, or
that there is, in tact. no object over there at all?l
In etfect, Klemke accuses Moore of overlooking that, on the phil-

osophical level, one is attempting an analysis ot common sense
statements, 2 which gives rise to technical terms. In other words
Moore is accused of ignoring the fact that words like 'know• and
'exist' are used in a special sense on the philosophical level.
Therefore, his arguments miss their metaphysical and epistemological targets.3
Thus, we have not yet finished considering the relevance
of ordinary language.

Now we take it up again in a somewhat dif-

ferent context, that of analysis.

Roughly speaking, whereas the

last chapter centered around the truth of common sense propositions, the present chapter picks up this problem in terms of !!,!!nin&:e.
Moore's position is this.
It is ;eossible to understand (common sense1 statements
about L.•uoh things asJ observed material ol>jects and other
selves, in their ordinary or popular meaning, and to know
their truth tor certain, without knowing what their correct analysis is.4

lnemke, EM, P• 19c ct., PP• 20.t 26-30. See also Malcolm
"Defending Oommon-Wense•, .§E!1 1 PP• 203-·1, 215-81 and Barnes, ~e
PhilosoDhical Predicament, P• 42.
2~., p. 30. See also l"'furpb.y, "Moore's 'Defence ot Com•
mon Sense , ~. PP• 303, 308•9.
3Moore denied this charge and maintained that he was (at
least operatively) aware of this distinction. ("Reply", PG.EM,
PP• 668-70• Ot., e.g. 1 "Ob~ecta of Perception", PS, P• 6~;
"Proof", PP, pp. 141-2 J.
-

-

4MurpbJr, .2.R• oit. 1 p. 310.

PP• 36-7.

See Moore's "Defence", PP,
Is thispaicr-or the reason why Moore spoke of common

sense "beliefs", and not "knowledge"?
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Now there is no real conflict between 11oore•s position
d that of the epistemologist, as long as the latter does not
extend the technical meaning of 'know•, tor example, so as to inlude its ordinary or common sense meaning.

However, when a

echnieal, philosophical term is used so as to include its comm.on
ense meaning, and when this results in a conflict between a
hilosophieal assertion and common sense--then Moore's defense of
ommon sense is at least relevant, it not conclusive.5 As .A';rer
aid: "the philosopher has no right to despise the beliefs ot com
on sense • • • What he is entitled to despise is (onlyJ the unetlecting analysis ot those beliets." 6
The crux ot the issue seems to be the meaning of •to
ow•.

For Moore, to know something does not imply knowing its

alysis.

For other philosophers, it does.? However, there are

till others who agree with Moore's position, but rejeot his
tatement ot the issue.

It is this latter disagreement that we

11 consider in what follows.

Parenthetically, it is worth noting that Moore's notion

t analysis implies that while common sense is the starting point
t

philosophy, it ia not the limit ot philosophy.
d most important problem ot philosophy is:

~o

For "the first
give a general

5Mu.rphy, tor one, believes that in this situation, H:>ore•s
guments are conclusive. <Jlla• ,g!!., PP• 312-3).
6.A. J. Ayer, La.nsuase, ~uth !as! Logic. 2d ed. London,

P• 51.

?Barnes, ll• .2!!•• P• 32.

I
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iescription ot the whole Universe."8
For Moore. as tor others, understanding Oommon-sense
statements and knowing them to be true is not enough. A
common-sense philosopher is not one who remains at the
level ot Common Sense. His quest is tor knowledge which
penetrates .further into the nature of things than unaided
Oommon Sense is able to.9

A.

What Js Analysis?

When Moore said that he knew a particular common sense
statement to be true and yet did not know its analysis, he was
distinguishing two difterent types of meaning that an expression
may have: its ordinary meaning• and a technical kind of meaning.
Analysis is a Aomewhat technical term tor a specific kind of
meaning.

In an effort to clarity this notion, we will first dis-

rtingulsh analysis from other kinds 0:£ meaning, and then consider
what it is that is analysed, and finally, how it is analysed.

l.

Xinds of Meaning.

.An expression or statement may

~ave several different types ot meaning.lo First ot all, the
meaning of an expression may be its sense !!.!, ordina..:::r t!BS'!8-6e•
A vivid example is found in Moore's lectures.

Who is there who does not know what is meant by saying
that some men are alive and others dead, ~utticiently

-

8 SHPP, P• 2.

9Morris Lazerowitz, "Moore and Philosophical .Analysis",
SPM, P• 232.
1010.emke notes that Moore also used 4 meaning' in the
sense 0£ (i) 'im.portance•-as in, "!bat was a meaningless gesture"
-and in the sense of (ii) emotive meaning. ht these two uses
have little meaning tor philosophy. (Jr:! 1 PP• 53-4).
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well to be able to say with certainty in ever so many
cases that some men are alive and others are dead? But
yet, if you try to de?!ne the meaning ot ilie word 'lite•
quite generally--to give an account of the difference
between lite and death, which will apply to all cases in
which we sa:y that one thing is alive and another dead,
you will certainly find it extraordinarily difficult.
The very same person who may know quite well that one
particular man is alive and another dead, may yet be quite
unable to say exactly what properties there are which are
common to a living man and to all other living things--a
living plant, a living cell; a living bacillus, and which
at the same time do not belong to a dead man or to anything not living. Vi!I, in the same way, it seems to me
we do usually understand quite well the meaning ot these
much more fundamental expressions 'real', •exists•, 'is'•
'is a tact•, 'is true• • • • even though we do not know
their meaning, in the sense or being able to define
give
analysis
thea.11

an

otJ

econdly, the meaning of an expression may be its use.

c1.e.,

"Often,

e are not only able to lunder•tand an expression • • • but we are
so able to use the expression intelligently or in accord with
ommon usage."12 And when someone consistently uses an expres•

ion correctly, we could say that he knows the meaning of that
Thirdly, the meaning ot an expression :might be its
Tb.us, one could speak of the meaning ot
'horse• as being "a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equusn. 1 3
erbal definition.

ourthly, the meaning of an expression could be its referent,
the object or concept to which an expre&sion refers. 14 For
llHoore• SMPPt PP• 205-6.
12nelilke, ~· P• .56· ~s distinction between "sense in
ordinary language• and •use" is made by Klemke. It is very doubt
ul, however, whether Moore made this distinction. (Of. "Necessity", Mind, PP• 289-90; !I· P• 6; ~. PP• 205-6, 216-?; "Deenoe", a>, PP• 19?-8; "Reply", PGJIJ;P. 548) Whether or not
his distI'nction is made does no~ seem important here.
l3Moore, E!t P• B.
14 While Moore reco
at times

I
I

I
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example, the meaning of 'good' is the object or idea which the
word stands ror.15
2.

The "Anal:sandum".

7or all four ot the kinds ot

meanings mentioned, what is to be analyzed (the anal:sandum) is
an expression or statement.

This is not the case in analysis.

Rather, what is to be analyzed is a concept or object.

As Moore

said in his "Reply":
I never intended to use the word ['analysis'J in such a
way that the analisandum would be a verbal hi\ression.
When I have ta!ite of analysing anytFllng, "w
I have
talked or analysing has always been an idea or concept
or proposition, and not a verbal expression.16

-

Unfortunately, Moore did noi always speak so unequivocally and
clearly. !hue he did, at times, speak ot analyzing words or expressions .17 But this seems to have been simply a misleading way ot
be equivalent to •use•, he usually spoke ot meaning in terms ot
naming. It is possible that the distinction between the two was
unclear to him. (See his "Repl7", where (p • .583) he equates ·the
"dirterent senses in which the word 'good' is used" and the "different characteristics or which it is a name"). Soaetiaes Moore
thought that what was named or referred to was an obieot, while
at other times the referent was taken to be a concep • ~or a
dis~ussion or Moore's naming theory ot meaning• see Ohite, M:OE,
PP• 39-50, and Kl9mke, !!:!1 PP• 57-62.

l5n, P• 6.
16 "Reply"•yfQEM, P• 66. Nelson believes that there is an
earlier and later
ew in Moore's writings on analysis. Nelson
also notes: "Although he CMooreJ was unclear about what the relation is between concepts, the entities objectively making up the
universe, and verbal expressions, he appears to have thought that
concepts are not only distinct trom and(at least from their side)
independent ot their verbal expressions but also distinct from
the entities objectively making up the universe." ("George Edward
Moore", ~e Encp,lf&edia ot Philosophy'. Vol. 5. Ed. by Paul Fil.wards. lew for :
cm111an and Fiee Press, 1967 1 p. 375).
l?see White's discussion ot the analzsandum (M:OE, pp.
50-3) tor numerous references.
---
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describing what he was about. 18

Despite the various terms Moore

employed, there is an essential coherence in his descriptions ot
analysis.
Since • • • when he J:MooreJ talks of a proposition or
concept he is talking in a misleading way about the meaniag
ot expressions ot various kinds, it follows that to propose
a proposition or concept tor the role of analzsandua is to
say that it is the meanings of expressions 'that we 'tiave to
analyse. Further, we saw that on his naming theory there
is no important difference between talking ot an analysis
of the entity ABC and an analysis ot the meaning of the
expression 'ABC'• We JBa7 conclude, therefore, that these
other genuine candidates for the role of ana~eandum,
namely, entities and conoepts--expressions o y sl!p into
the ring when the judge is not looking--are all one and
the same candidate, namely, the meaning of an expression,
in disguise.l9
!his brings out the main relation between analysis and
ordinary understanding or use, namely, analysis presupposes an
runderstanding of the ordinary meaning of an expression or concept: analysis is about the ordinary meaning of a ooncept. 20
"Philosophy only analyses words of which we already know the mealning, in the sense that we can use the word right, although we
could not perhaps saz what it means." 21 As this was expressad
18Klemke's contused discussi~n of Moore's ase of analysis overlooks Moore's remark: "There is, of course, a sense in
~hieh verbal expressions o~n b& •analysad.'"
But this is a nontechnical sense of analysis. "Reply", PGEM, p. 661.
l9Wb.ite, MzCE, PP• 52-3. Moore•s position could also be
put this way: the analfsandum. is commoa sense, tor the common
sense view is not a oo~eotlon ot 2ro2ositions. (.Q!, p. 280).
20sMPP, pp. 267-9. Ct. n. 14 above.

21 Moore, "!he Justification of Analysis", Anal;sis, 1
(1934), P• 28. See also: SMPP, PP• 2l6 1 219,279e3otJ; u our Forms
ot Scepticism", .fl 1 pp. l~ "Detence", ,!l, p. 37.
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later by others: there is a distinction between knowing how to
use an expression or concept, and knowing the conditions under
which the expression can be used correctly--and the latter depends upon the former.
So far, then, we have observed two things which help
cla1•ity why Moore believed that "knowing X" does not imply "knowing the analysis of X":

(i) "knowing the analysis ot

X" is

"knowing the t&chnical mean.i;ig of X"; and (ii) this is "knowing
the technical meaning ot an idea of concept or proposition or
meaning".
Bow we can consider l1.2!! the meaning in question is analyzed, and the criteria ot an analysis.

3.

Kinds of Analyses.

According to White's interpreta-

tion or Moore, there are three ways in which the analysis of the
ordinary meaning of a concept may be carried out.

The analysis

may be by division, by analytic distinction, or bj inspection. 22
22nemke suggests that the various kinds of analysis can

be classified as follows. (EM, P• 68)
"l. Retutational anirysis:

(a) Showing contradictions;

(b) Translation into the concrete;
Distinctional analysis;
3. Deoompositional analysis:
(a) Definitional;
(b) Divisional;
4. Reductional analysis."
However. this classification seems to be very misleading.
For example, "refutational analysis" is not a description of analysis in its technical sense. What Klemke refers to as refutational analysis is actually an appeal to ordinary language. Ref·
utational analysis is not so much a kind ot analysis as it is the
purpose or result of distinctional analysis. llemke himself
seems to have doubts about the appropriateness of hie acoount.
(Cf. PP• 62 and 72). Moreover, Moore warned agliinet just this
2.

I I

(a) Analysis by Divis~. 2 3
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One way or analyzing the

eaning or a concept is by dividing a complex concept into its
omponent parts.

.An example of analysis by division is given in

"!he Refutation or Idealism", where Moore analyzes the notion of
sensation into two elements:

ons~iousness. 24
!'his type

c?nsciousness and the object of

Similarly, a beli~t oan be analyzed into two
act of belief and the object or beliet. 25

or

8.!lalysis is not particularly problematic.

t it is worth noting a few characteristics of an analysis by

ivision.

First of all, there is no doubt that the analzsandUJll

is a concept or entity.

analyses.

Tb.is is not clearly the case in other

Secon1ly, the analysandum is not synonymous

analysans. as seems to be the case in the next kind ot
considered.

Furthermore, this type of analysis is only

pplicable in dealing with complex concepts.
or example, "are notions ot that simple kind,

Yellow and good,
~ut

of which deti-

analysesJ are composed and with which the power ot
sort of contusion. (Ot. "Reply", PGEM,pp. 661, 664-5). See also
• 36 above, and n. 27 below.
---230n this type of analysis, ct. lJhite, M:OE, PP• ?3-4,
201-8. White makes this 1nteresti!!S observation. "Moat philosohers who took this division view rot analysisJ searched tor some
timate set of elements trom whicn the other parts and wholes
re to be built. Moore also hints that analysis must, it pushed
far enough, get down to the simplest elements • • • But he did
explicitly deny, somewhat in contrast to others, that the whole
s nothing more than the sum ot its constituents.'' (p. 73).
24
PS, P• l?.

-

2 5Moore, SM.PP, p. 303.

sis of "esthetic appreciation".

Ot. also PEt P• 189 tor an analy--

Ii
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urtber defining Cor, divisionJ eeases." 26
nalysis

re~ults

Finally, this type ot

in new information.

(b) Analysis bz Analytic Distinction. 2 7

A second type

alysis is referred to by White as "analytic distinction".

ot

!he

aradigm of this kind of analys\s is: "The concept 'being a broidentical w!:th the concept 'being a male sibling•.u 28
is example

pr~vidas

the chief characteristics of an anRlytic

istinction: (i) it is applicable to both simple and complex
deas; (ii) the anal?$andum and the analysans are synonymous; 29
iii) the

analz~ans

does not seem to be informative, rather it

imply clarifies the analysandum; and therefore (iv) the "°alzthe analysans seem to be verbal expressions.

!he

three characteristics give rise to a problem: the paradox of

-

26PEt P• 8.

2.?or.

White, M:OE, pp. 74-83. 'White also talks about
oore•s use of "disorlmlnative distinction", wh~.ch is very simiar (if not identical) to lOemk:e's discussion ot "distinctional
alysis". (Ot. n. 20 above). Unlike Klemke, however, White
oes not considgr discriminative distinction a type ot analysis.
Despite what he Sli..YS, I think that Moore did not wish to identiy discriminative distinction with, or make it a part ot, analyis and that he only appears to do so because of th9 ambiguity
t the word 'distinction••" (MzOE, P• 78). White follows this
tatement with tour reasons (p:-'78), and reitera·tes one ot them a
ittle later (p. 81).
28 "Reply", PGEM, P• 664. White carelessly cites this as
example or analysis by division. (M:OE, PP• 73-4) As Morris
zerowitz says: this is not "the moder-l'or all analysis done in
hilosophy." ("Moore and Philosophical Analysisn, SPM, p. 228).
29"In essence the Cnatural!stioJ tallacy is simply that
t identifying or equating any two notions which in tact are disinet, or of supposing two words to be synonymous which are not."
!1:.Q!, p. 124).
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alysis.30
!he paradox of analysis can be stated in this way.

Every

alysis is a statement which not only expresses an identity beween the analzsandum and the analzsans, but which is also intorative.31

However, (1) it an analysis is a statement of identity

30Although this problem can be found in the writings ot
egel and Frege, recent discussion was initiated by c. H. Langord' s formulation ot it in "!he Notion of Analysis in Moore's
ilosopby", PGEM:, P• 323. Untortunately, Langford formulated
he problem in ~erms of "verbal expressions"• which is misleadng. It is not surprising, then, that Moore rejected both views
f analysis which Langford presented in his essay.
31 In his "Reply", Moore gave the following conditions tor
correct analysis:
(1) "both analzsandum and anal1sans must be concepts or
propositionsTI.e., meaningsJ, au, mere verbal exp
sions." (p. ~)
(2) "both anal\!andum and analysans • • • must in some
sense, be tie same concept." (p. 666)
(3) "the eXJ>ression used tor the analzsandum must be a
difteriii\ expression from tha' used for the analzsans." (p. 666)
(4) 1 ihe eiiression used tor the analzsans must 9xplicit!z men on concepts which are not explicitly mentioned by the expression used tor the an.alzsandum."
(p. 666)
(5) "the method of combination should be explicitly men-

tione<I by theexpress!on used tor the analzsans."

(p. 663)
(6) "nobody can know that the analzsandum applies to an

object without knowing that the ana!zsans applies to
it." (p. 663)
(?) "nobody can verit7 that the analzsandum applies without verifying that the analzsans applies." (p. 663)
(8) "any expression which expresses the analzsandum must
be S1'?lonymous with any expression wh!cS expresses the
analzeana ... (p. 663)
the ordering given here follows Klemke's. White reters
o six conditions, because he combines (1) and (2) into a single
on<friion; and he omits (8) because this is equivalent to condiions (2) and (3).

, I'
'
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tautology, and unintormative--and therefore is not
n analysis; and (11) it an analysis is not a statement of idenity-1 then it is not an analysis.

Thie paradox is significant

ecause it raises doubt as to the justification of Moore's disinction between knowing a common sense statement to be true and
owing the correct analysis of that statement.
!he central problem in the paradox of analysis lies in

list of criteria for a correct analysis.

To be specific,

ore maintains that analysis has to do with concepts, and not
erbal expressions.

However, given the criteria of being synony-

intormative, the two terms ot an analysis cannot be a
they must be verbal expressions.
ased on nominalism or veritioationism.

This criticism is
Given this stance, phil-

sophy is merely a "conversion analysis".
In philosophy an c.nalysis is used to make a linguistic
alteration, it is used to ~ustity a manoeuvre with terminology. It is a linguistic conversion which in every
instance creates the semantic il~usion that a theory about phenomena is being stated.3
en we turn to the third type ot analysis, we find that this
can be restated in terms ot Moore's notion ot meaning.
(c) Analzsis by Inspection.

Moore's basic view ot what

s involved in an analysis is that of observing what it is that
think, or have before our minds.

Rather than being

distinct method ot analysis, inspection is rather "the way to

32 Lazerowitz, .22• cit., P• 245. Ot. also Richard Rorty's
troduction to !he Li;sriitrc furn. Ed. by R. Rorty. Chicago:
niv. ot Ohioago-,ress~7. pp. 2?tt.

5?
test a proposed analysis".33 As was just mentioned, the central
)roblem is Moore's contention that analysis deals with concepts

or meanings.

Lazerowitz puts it this way.

~e picture of themselves that philosophical analysts
create is that of people who examine the meanings ot
terms, or the concepts denoted by them, more care~lly
and with greater skill and penetration than is done by
others. And furthermore, they make it look as it they
are examining objects of a special, perhaps raritied 1
kind. !hey make it look as it they are examining ob~ects
which accompany terms and are given with them by psychological contiguity • • • the written word "elephant," for
example, is present to sight; its meaning, the concept
elephant, is present to the mind. And a philosopher who
practices analysis with the last of the above objectives
in mind gives every appearance of believing that by carefully scrutinizing the concept ele~hant he will learn
zoological facts about actual elep ants.34

intite expresses the same point by saying:
The picture, taken over trom his concept theory of meanwhich Moore has of a person bent on ana1j'ilng a
ion is that of him concentrating on, peering intently
at, something behind and naked of words, which he holds
before the mind's eye.35
in~,

[n

other words, Moore's "language suggests that something more

than linguistic fact is thrown into clear light, that hidden
raets about things are revealed."36

Lazerowitz offers this al-

ternative.
!he picture ot the penetrating gazer into concepts changes
it we replace the expression "meaning ot a term," ••• b7

the expression •11teral use of a term." ••• It removes
33M:CE, p. 6?; ct. also P• 112.
34Lazerowitz, .!m•

Si!••

35M:OE, p. 61.
36Laserowitz, .2:2•

s!!•t P• 240.

P• 238.
Emphasis added.

the false notion that the meanings of words contain hidden
tacts about things which analysis can bring to light.3?
!'he preceding discussion has indicated that Moore's disinction between knowing something and knowing its analysis rests
naming theory ot meaning.

And because ot this, Moore con-

ot philosophy as not only clarifying, but also discoverng things about the universe.

Others have accepted Moore's dis-

inction, but base it on a ...........
use theory ot meaning. And because ot
of philosophy as merely clarifying our lanage.

Perhaps the only possibility lett tor Moore is analysis

division.

Jor this method ot analysis allows him to retain

s theory of meaning. to discover things about the universe,
d avoid the main objection of ordinary language philosophers,
paradox of analysis.

B.

Oommon Sense and Philosopl!J::

fb.e basic issue to which we have addressed ourselves can

e expressed as follows: what, precisely, is the relationship
etween common sense and philosophy?

The notion ot common sense

emains unclear so long as this question is unanswered.

In

hapter 3t we considered whether or not the conflict which charcterizes this relationship is simply an apparent, linguistic
ontlict.

It would seem that there can be a real conflict only

t the philosophical statements which contradict common sense
ave an empirical content.
3?Ibid., p. 239 •
..............

I
I
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In the present chapter, the problem has been shifted from
realm of truth to that of meaning.

With the distinction be-

ween "knowing X" and "knowing the analysis of X", Moore mainained that what is problematic is not the truth of common sense
eliets, but their analysis or meaning.

Philosophical statements

e simply attempts to explicate and go beyond the ordin&r7 mean-

common sense beliefs,

In this context, it seems that the

a real conflict between common sense and philosophy qnlz

t common sense beliefs have a meta
he crucial issue.

sical content.

this is

The matter might be stated in several ways.

e can ask whether or not common sense has a philosophical con-

ent, i.e., whether common sense is philosophically neutral, or
hilosophically committed.

For example, doee the comm.on sense

eliet in material objects imply that a philosophical analysis
of this belief must result in a substantive or realist analysis--

a Moore thought?
ry

Or, we might inquire whether or not the ordi-

language in which common sense is expressed commits one to

particular philosophical position.

It is evident, then, that we have not arrived at a precise statement of Moore's notion of common sense, nor of the relation between comm.on sense and philosophy.

Ye have, however,

stated the problem in a number of different ways, as Moore himself might have done.

We, like Moore, have, in effect, remained

I.
I

adrift on the sea of analysis.

ii
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Hicks). A£ist. Soc. Su~l. Vol. 3 (1923) 1 95-128;
lfoore•s cOiiir!b., 9S:I1 • lepr.: l,?1 v. ?3.

52.

A Defence of Common Sense. jontemJ?Oraf!' British PhilosoRh.!•
Second Series, ed. by J. • HU!rhea , ton4oni Ilien I
Unwin; Bew York: Macmillan, 1925, 193-223. Repr.: U•
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Death of Dr. Mcfaggart. ~. n.s.,34 (Apr., 1925), 269-71.
s,.mposium: !he :Nature of Sensible Appearances. (By G. Dawes
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Review ot A. :N. Whitehead, Religion in the Maki~ (Bew York,
1926), !he Nation and Atlienaeum, 1146. 12, 19 , 664.
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Symposium: "Pacts and Propositions." (By.,. P. Ramsey and
G. E. Moore). A£&st. Soc. 8URPl. Vol. ? (192?), 153-206;
Moore's contrib., !71-2~. Repr.: .fe, v. ?3.
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57.

Symposium: Indirect Knowledge. (By G. E. Moore and H. W. B.
Joseph). Arist. Soc. Suppl. Vol. 9 (1929), 19-66; Moore'
contrib., 19-56.
1930

58.

Preface, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical
Essays, by F. P. Ramsey. F.d. by R. B. Braithwaite. ton
~on:~. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt,
Brace, & Co., 1931, 1950, vii-viii.

59.

Is Goodness a Quality? (By G. E. Moore, H. W. B. Joseph,
and A. E. Ta;ylor). Ari st. Soc. Supftl. Vol. 11 (1932),
116-68; Moore's contr!b., 116-31.
epr.: ~' v. ?3.

60.

Symposium: Imaginary Objects. (By G. Ryle, R. B. Braithwaite and G. E. Moore). Arist. Soc • .a, SU:E,Pl. Vol. 12
(1933~ 1 18-?0; Moore's contrib., 55-76. Repr.: ~. v.73.

61.

The Justification of Analysis. (Notes of the fourth lectur
given by Moore in a course on The Elements of Philosophy.
Notes taken by Margaret Masterman and corrected by Prof.
Moore). Analysis, 1 (1934), 28-30.

62.

Symposium: Is Existence a Predicate? (By w. KnP.ale and G.
E. Noore). Arist. Soc.a Suvl• Vol. 15 (1936), 154-88;
Moore's contrib., 175=8 •
epr.: PP, v. 73.
Proof of an External World. (Read Nov. 22, 1939). British
Academy, Proc., 25 (1939), 273-300. Repr.: ~. v. 7~.
1940

64.

An Autobiography. The Philosoph~ of G. E. Moore. Ed. by
Paul A. Schilpp. EVanston an Chicago: Northwestern
Univ., 1942, 3-39.

65.

A Reply to My Critics. The Philoso~h~ of G. E. Moore. Ed.
by Paul A. Schilpp. 'E'Vanston anhlcago: Northwestern
Univ., 1942, 535-677•

66.

Russell's "Theory of Descriptions." The Philosop~ of Bertrand Russell. Ed. by Paul A. Schilpp. EVans on anu
Chicago: Northwestern Univ., 1944, 175-225. Repr.: EE•

v. ?3.
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Addendum to My "Reply." The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 2d
ed. Ed. by Paul A. Scfiiipp. New Turk: TUdor Pub!. Co.,
1952, 677-8?. Re: 82.
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68.

Letter to c. J. Ducasse. (:Dated Jeb. 8, 1943). Philos.
thenomenol. Res., 28 (1968), 323-6. Repr.: PGIA, 2! ed.,
952, 681 4-E. • o~. 133.
Some Main Problems of Philosophz. (Lectures given in 19101911). tGn!on: George Xlien & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1953.
Reviews:
Ambrose, A. J. P.b.ilos.) 51 (K&Jr, 1954) 1 328-31.
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~ t. Philos., 31 (1956), 362-6.
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OhishQlm, R. M. Philos. phenom. Res., 15 (June, 1955),
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?O. Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. Mind, 63 (1954), 1151 289-3161 64 (1955) 1 1-2?. Repr.: ]!, v. ?3.
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1'wo Correetions. (Concerning "'Wittgenstein's Lectures in
1930-1933. III." See: 70). Mj.nd, 64 (1955) 1 264.
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I. Are the Characteristics of Particular Things Universal or Particular? (1923), l?-31.
II. A Defence of Common Sense. (1925) 1 35-59.
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IV. Is Goodness a Quality? (1932), 89-101.
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VII. Proof of an External World. (1939), 12?-50.
VIII. Russell's "Theory of Descriptions." (1944), 15195.

68

IX.
X.

XI.

Four Forms of Scepticism. (Jirst publ.), 196226.
Certainty. (First publ.), 22?•51.
Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933. (1954-5),
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Two Corrections. (1955), 324.

Reviews:
Ambrose, A. Philos. Rev., ?O (1961), 408-11.
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Root, H. E. J. theoi. Stu!., 13 (1962), 23?-40.
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Teichmann, J. Mind, 70 (1961) 1 280.
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F.d. by Casimir Lewy. London:
George Il!en I nw!n
d.; New York: !l'h.e PJ'a.cmillan Co.,
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Ayer, A. J. Twentieth Cent., 1?2 (1963), 120.
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Lazerowitz, ~. 39 (1964), 165-?3.
MacICinnon, D. M. J. £heol. Stud., 14 (1963) 1 555-6.
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Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press,
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II. Necessity, 129-31.
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The justification of analysis, 16~;-71.
Questions of speculative philosophy, 1?2-9.
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(v. 280)• 394-417. Repr.: Essaya in Ana.lzsis. LoncronT
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• !hree Aspects of Moore's Philosophy. (Read at a
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80.

AYD, A. J. G. E. Moore on Propositions and Facts. H:D,
(v. 219) • . Repr.: MetaRbJ'sios and Common Sense. Ban
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84.

BAlfERJI, KA.LI KRISHl'fA.

(1960-1961), 93-102.

G. E. Moore.

Philos •.. Sl!!£t. ,A., 33
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BARNES, WINSTON H. The Philoso~hical Predicament. London:
Adam & Charles Blae~, 1950,9-160. (Chapters 2-5).
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BARONE, FRANCESCO. George :Ed.ward Moore. Les Grands Courants de la pensee Mondiale Contemporaine.. ouvrage pu'6lie
sous la direction de M~ F. Sciacca. III 8 Partie: Portraits. Vol. II. Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1'9b4°,
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BAUMRIN, BERNARD H. Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?
Philos. Quart., 5 (1968), 79-89.
88.
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BAUSOLA, ADRIANO. La Filosofia Morale di G. E. Moore.
Filos. neoscol., 56 (1964), 376-408.
BENTLEY, A.F. Logicians Underlying Postulations.
Sci., 13 (1946), 3-19.
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BERGMANN, GUSTAV. Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence
in G. E. Moore. Ingu11' V (1962), 116-42. Repr.: Logic
and Reality. Madison: niv. of Wisconsin Press, 1964,
I$t!-70. Repr.: SPM, (v. 208), 81-94.
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BLACK, MAX.

92.

Anal~sis Be Inf'ormative?
nomenal. Ras •• 6 (1946), 628-31. Re: 213 •

•
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95.
96.
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Philos. phe-

Philos. Rev., 58

On Speaking with the Vulgar.

---c1-9--4-9), 616-21. Repr.: .fil!!,
____.....,._.
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How can

(v. 208), 226-S.

Philosop~

Re: 231.
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{1943), 682-95 •
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The "Paradox of Analysis.'•
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The "Paradox of Analysis" Again: A Reply.
Re: 314. Cf. 311.

--.7-.-....Re:

214.

Cf. 123, 213, .314.
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BLACKSTONE, RICHARD M. An EXamination of the Philosophical
Methods of G. E. Moore. Unpubl. Disser., Brown Univ.,

1968.

97.

BLANSHARD, BRAND. Linguistic Philosophy - Some Earlier
Forms. Reason and Analysis. Londf)n: George Allen & Unwin, 196~, 308-38. Re: 5~. 234.

98.

BLEGVAD, MOGENB. Mill, Moore, ar:d the Naturalistic Fallacy.
Philosophical Essa\1Dedicatea to Gunnar Aspelin. Lund:
~. K: Gleerup,
63.
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99.

BOUWSMA, O.K. Moore's Theory of Sense-Data. PGEM, (v.
280), 201-21. Repr.~ Philosophical Essazs. ""ll'iicoln:
Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1965; 1-20.

100.

- - - - · Reflections on Moore's Recent Book rsome Main
Pro;lems of Philosophil. Philos. Rev., 64 (1955), 24863. Repr.: Philosophical Essa;Ys• London: Univ. of Nebraska .P:i:'ess, 1965, I29=48; M:ER, (v. 219).

101.

BRAITHWAITE, R.B. Geor~e Edward Moore, 1873-1958. Proc.
Brit. Acad., 47 (1961), 293-309. Repr.: George Ed.Ward
Moore, 1SZ3-195§. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963;

102.

-H:'.ER,

(v. 219}.

•

Verbal Ambigi1ity and Philosophical Analysis.
19, 1928). Proc. Arist. Soc., 28 (1928), 135-
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54.
103.
104.
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BROAD, C.D.
~.
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G. E. Moore. The Manchester Guardian (Oct. 25,
Repr. with corrections and additions: ~' (v. 73)

•

G. E. Moore's Latest Published Views of Ethics.
(1961), 435-57. Repr.: M:ER, (v. 219).
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108.

Certain Features in Moore'3 Ethical Doctrines.

(v. 280), 43-6?.

Is "Goodness" a Nam'9 of Simple, Non-natural
Quality. Proc. Arist. Soc. (1934). Repr.:with some additions and moairications as part two (57-67) of: Certain
Features • • • (v. 103).

Phi.losop:hy and "Common Sense."
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• Symposium: Is There "Knowledg3 by
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BROYLES, JAMES E. Language and Common Sense.
Quart., 6 (1969), 233-9 •

110.

BRUNIUS, TEDDY. G. E. Moore's Anallsis of Beautz.
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J3UBSER, EBERHARD.
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112.

.
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CAI1PANAI,E, DOMENICO. Filoso.fia ed Etica Scientifica nel
Pensiero di~. E. Moore. Bari: Adr1at1ca ~itr., 1962.

llil.

CAMP.BELL, C.A. Common-Sense Propositions and Philosophical
Paradoxes. Proc. Arist. Soc., 45 (1944)~ 1-25. Re: 234.

115.

CARGILE, JAMES. On Believing You Believe.
(1967), 177-83.

llf>.

CARNEY, JAMES D. Malcolm and Moore's Rebuttals.
(1962), 353-63. Re: 230.
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• Was Moore Talking Nonsense in 1918?
__p_h_e_n_o-menol. Res., 22 (1962), 521-?.
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CARTER, ROBF.RT R.
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CHAPPELL, V.C.
Re: ?30,234.

120.
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Philos.

The Importance of Intrinsic Value.

Ph.ilos. phenomenol. Res., 28 (1968), 567-??.

Malcolm on Moore.

and Analysis.
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George F.dward Moore: Common Sense

Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis.
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CLEARY, DENIS. An Essay on G. E. Moore.
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Philosophers and Ordinary Language.

60 (1951), 317-28.
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• Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism."
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DUMMETT, MICHAEL. A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the
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